I show that the equilibrium distribution of matches associated with the empirical transferable utility (TU) one-to-one matching model introduced by Choo and Siow (2006a,b) corresponds to the fixed point of system of K + L nonlinear equations; with K and L respectively equal to the number of discrete types of women and men. I use this representation to derive new comparative static results, showing how the match distribution varies with match surplus and the marginal distributions of agent types.
Canadian Economics Association Presidential Address, Siow (2008) noted that (i) whether an equilibrium matching was globally unique was an open question and (ii) that the substitution patterns generated by the model were poorly understood. Decker (2010) and Decker, Lieb, McCann and Stephens (2013) subsequently proved uniqueness of the CS matching and also derived some limited qualitative comparative static results. In independent work, Salanie (2010, 2012 ) also showed uniqueness of the CS matching, but did not present comparative static results.
Let Kand L denote the number of discrete types of men and women respectively. A matching in the CS model consists of K + L + KL terms. These terms correspond to the number of each type of woman and man who chooses to remain single in equilibrium (K + L), as well as the number of each type of feasible couple (KL). I show that an equilibrium CS matching corresponds to a fixed point of a certain system of K + L nonlinear equations. The solution to these equations equals the number of "singles" of each type in equilibrium. The number of each type of couple is a closed form expression of the number singles and the model parameters (e.g., Choo and Siow, 2006a,b) . 1 The matching model
Preferences
Consider a single matching market composed of two large populations of, for concreteness, women and men. While I will often invoke language familiar from the marriage market application, there are numerous other empirically relevant examples of assignment games (cf., Koopmans and Beckmann, 1957 ; Shapley and Shubik, 1971; Fox, 2010) . For each woman and man we respectively observe the discretely-valued characteristics W i ∈ W = {w 1, , . . . , w K } and X j ∈ X = {x 1 , . . . , x L } . 2 The K types of women and L types of men may encode, for example, different unique combinations of years-of-schooling and age. While K and L are assumed finite, they may be very large in practice.
Observationally identical women have heterogeneous preferences over different types of men, but are indifferent between men of the same type. Specifically female i's utility from matching with male j is given by
where α (w k , x l ) is the systematic utility a type W i = w k women derives from matching with a type X j = x l man, ε i X j = L l=1 1 X j = x l ε il captures unobserved heterogeneity in women's preferences over alternative types of men, and τ (w k , x l ) is the equilibrium transfer that a type X j = x l man must pay a type W i = w k women in order to match. Transfers may be negative and their determination is discussed below. Here 1 (•) denotes the indicator function. Since the stochastic component of female match utility, ε i X j , varies with male type alone (i.e., his specific identify does not matter), women are indifferent amongst observationally identical men. A similar restriction on male preferences ensures that the equilibrium transfer, τ (w k , x l ), depends on agent types alone (as asserted) (cf., Galichon and Salanie, 2012) .
A women may also choose to remained unmatched, or 'single', in which case her utility is given by
Men also have heterogenous preferences. Man j's utility from matching with woman i is given by
where β (w k , x l ) is the systematic utility a type X j = x l men derives from matching with a type
k is a heterogenous component of match utility. Here τ (w, x) enters with a negative sign as we conceptually imagine men 'paying' women (recall that transfers may be negative). The utility from remaining unmatched is
Preference heterogeneity ensures that, for any given transfer function τ (w, x) , observationally identical women will match with different types of men. If the support of the heterogeneity distribution is rich enough all types of matches will be observed in equilibrium.
Let ε = (ε i0 , ε i1 , . . . , ε iL ) and υ = υ 
Notes: Let r kl ≥ 0 denote the number of k-to-l matches. Feasibility of a matching imposes the
are independently and identically distributed Type I extreme value random variables
Assumption (1) is slightly more general than that maintained by Choo and Siow (2006a,b) who additionally impose the restriction σ ε = σ υ . Chiappori, Salanie and Weiss (2012) allow the scale parameters, σ ε and σ υ , to vary with, respectively, k and l. 3 
Equilibrium
be a vector of model parameters -to be more precisely specified below -and τ a KL × 1 vector of transfers. The total number of type k women is given by p k , that of type l men by q l . Let p = (p 1 , . . . , p K ) and q = (q 1 , . . . , q L ) . Denote the probability, given a hypothetical transfer vector τ , that a type k woman matches with a type l man by e D kl (θ; τ ). The probability of remaining Total 'demand' for type l men by type k women is therefore
which, after some manipulation, gives
For l = 1, . . . , L we get a conditional 'supply' of type l men to each of the k = 1, . . . , K types of women equal to
The transfer vector, τ , adjusts to equate the KL female 'demands' with the KL male 'supplies' so that in equilibrium
with the 'eq' superscript denoting an equilibrium quantity.
Let
Imposing (6), adding (3) and (5), exponentiating and rearranging yields r eq kl = r eq k0
where I let r eq kl = r eq kl (θ, τ eq , p, q) to economize on notation. 
Exponentiating both sides of equations (8) and (9) and summing over, respectively, l and k yields 
which, since 
for r 0 = (r 10 , . . . , r K0 , r 01 , . . . , r 0L ) and θ = (γ , λ) with
We have shown that r solve for the number of each of the K × L types of matches in closed form using (7) above:
for k = 1, . . . , K and l = 1, . . . , L.
The representation of r 
. . , L)} be a closed rectangular region with some arbitrarily small positive constant and Γ be a closed and bounded subset of R KL . Let
Jacobian matrix associated with (10) . If J (r 0 ) is a P-matrix on T , meaning all its principal minors are positive, then Theorem 4 of Gale and Nikaido (1965) implies uniqueness of r eq 0 (on T ) for all (γ, λ) ∈ Γ × (0, 1). Thus showing that J (r 0 ) is a P-matrix on T would provide an alternative proof of equilibrium uniqueness in the CS model. Unfortunately verifying the P-matrix property can be computationally hard in practice, especially when the Jacobian is large, non-symmetric and otherwise complicated, as is the case here (cf., Coxson, 1994) . 4 In results not reported here, I have shown that J (r eq 0 ) is a P-matrix (indeed a diagonally dominant matrix in the sense of McKenzie (1960)). However, I have been unable to show that the result holds for r 0 = r eq 0 (although I conjecture that it does). It is also possible show that B (r 0 ; p, q, θ) is a contraction mapping in the neighborhood of r eq 0 . This provides some justification for using fixed point iteration to find an equilibrium (as was done for the numerical examples reported below). However, proving that B (r 0 ; p, q, θ) is a contraction on all of T remains a goal for future research. 
where
K + L vector of matching market entrance probabilities for each type of women and man is s 0 = (s 10 , . . . , s K0 , s 01 , . . . , s 0L ) . These probabilities are the unique solution to the K + L sys-tem of nonlinear equations
Equation (13) is identical in form to an incomplete information entry game with K + L players.
Multiplicity of equilibria in such games is frequent in practice (e.g., Bajari, Hahn, Hong and Ridder, 2011). Here uniqueness evidently follows from the specific form of the inclusive values.
In an initial stage each agent decides whether to enter the matching market or remain unmatched.
The probability of entry depends on the surplus associated with the different types of matches available to an agent (e.g., γ k1 , . . . , γ kL for a type k female). It also depends on the participation rate of all other types of agents as well as their relative population sizes. The influence of these various factors is summarized by the inclusive value terms (12) .
Once the 'entry' decision has been made agents match with different types of partners according to the closed form rule (11).
Comparative statics
An attraction of the CS model, compared to reduced form models of the marriage market (e.g., Angrist, 2002; Schwartz, 2010) , is that it allows the researcher to undertake counterfactual analysis.
What would happen to the distribution of marriage if the number of college educated females increased? How would the marriage rate change in response to a decline in match surplus, induced by, for example, changes in tax policy or divorce laws? By comparing the observed matching with a counterfactual one computed under a different distribution of types or model parameters, these questions may be answered numerically. Representation (10) suggests that we may compute such counterfactuals by fixed point iteration, using the initial assignment for starting values.
Deriving analytic results on the substitution patterns implied by the CS model is more difficult.
Such results are useful because they provide insight into the economic structure of the model. dr m0 dp k
and an analogous result holding for
(ii) Partial symmetry of semi-elasticities:
dr m0 dp k 1 r m0 = dr k0 dp m
(iii) Aggregate elasticity of single-hood:
for k = 1, . . . , K and an analogous result holding for
(iv) Constant returns to scale:
Proof. See Appendix 5. 
Implication (iii)
, which is new, shows that the special structure of the CS model makes it possible to derive some equilibrium elasticities in closed form. Consider the probability that a random draw from the population, women and men, is single. How does this probability change in response to an increase in the size of a specific subgroup, say type k, women? Implication (i) of the Theorem suggests that single-hood rises across all women, and especially type k women, and declines across all men. Implication (iii) shows that the net effect is an overall increase in single-hood with the elasticity being equal to type k's share of all singles.
Implication (iv) confirms that the CS model exhibits constant results to scale. Holding the type distributions of men and women fixed, increasing market size has no effect on the probability of marriage.
It is well known that the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property of the conditional logit model structure places strong restrictions on substitution patterns in single agent discrete choice problems (McFadden, 1974) . A concern is that similar problems arise here. Consider a model with three types of women: high school dropouts (type 1), high school graduates (type 2) and those with a 4-year degree (type 3). For simplicity assume there is only one type of man. Not all women secure a husband and vice versa. I assume that high school dropouts and high school graduates generate similar systematic match surpluses with γ 11 = γ 21 = −1/2. College graduates generate a systematic match surplus of γ 31 = 0. Table 2 gives the equilibrium matching associated with this marriage market when p 1 = 5/9, p 2 = 3/9, and p 3 = 1/9. I set q 1 = 1 so that, initially, there are a sufficient number of men for all women. As expected, given the form of γ, high school dropouts and high school graduates are more likely than college graduates to remain unmarried.
Now consider a doubling of the population of high school dropout women. This influx of women increases the pools of unmarried among all types of women. We might also expect that the response is stronger for high school graduates than it is for college graduates. Since high school graduates are 'similar' to dropouts in terms of the marriage surplus they generate, this group should be disproportionally affected. It turns out that this predicted elasticity ranking is incorrect. The number of unmarried high school graduate women increases by 100×(0.1724 − 0.1617) /0.1617 ≈ 6.6 
Derived results
It is possible to use Theorem 1 to derive some additional comparative static results.
First, consider the effect of a percent increase in the population size of women, holding is type composition fixed. We have, using (iii) of Theorem 1
Equation (14) shows that CS model generates sharp implications for the effect of changes in the sex ratio on the marriage rate (cf., Angrist, 2002) .
Second, the semi-elasticity of single-hood for type m females given an unit increase in the surplus parameter γ kl is dr m0 dγ kl 1 r m0 = dr m0 dp k
Since this is the sum of opposite-signed terms the sign of this effect is ambiguous (cf., Decker, Lieb,
McCann and Stephens, 2013). However it turns out that we can get a sharper result if we consider the effect on aggregate single-hood of a unit increase in all γ kl for k = 1, . . . , K and l = 1, . . . , L. To motivate this counterfactual we can think of an economy-wide change in tax policy, divorce law, or contraceptive availability which changes the utility of marriage relative to single-hood. Calculations in the proof of Theorem 1 show that this semi-elasticity is a weighted average of type-specific population shares. Weights are greatest for types that are neither very likely, nor very unlikely, to be single under the status quo. Specifically we get the closed form expression
This semi-elasticity measures the effect -on the unconditional probability of matching -of an economy-wide increase in the returns from doing so.
Third, observe that 
Further areas for research
This paper has presented a systematic analysis of the equilibrium properties of the CS model, building on prior work by others. Theorem 1 indicates, perhaps unsurprisingly given its conditional logit foundation, that the CS model has strong comparative static implications. These implications could be used to test the empirical usefulness of the CS model, and also to guide the development of more general models. As in single agent discrete choice models, it seems fruitful to explore modeling frameworks that allow for correlation in the unobserved component of match utility associated with different types of partners.
Fixed point iteration could be useful for researchers interested in estimating models where K and/or L are large, but where γ = γ (η) is parameterized in terms of a smaller dimensional η. In such a situation the researcher could use iteration to solve for the equilibrium matching associated with a particular choice of η and λ in order to evaluate a log likelihood function (Rust, (1987) . 5 This method of computation would be especially attractive if it could be shown that B (r 0 ; p, q, θ) is a contraction on all of T .
Proofs and derivations
In what follows we write, for example, B (r 0 ; p, q, θ) = B (r 0 ) when dependence on p, q and θ is not germane.
Proof of Theorem 1 and Corollaries
The This identifies the sign structure of the inverse Jacobian. Fourth, the partitioned inverse formula is used to establish various bounds on the elements of the inverse Jacobian which in turn provide bounds for various elasticities. In what follows I drop the 'eq' superscript from r 0 to simplfy the notation when doing so does not cause confusion.
Step 1: Calculation of Jacobian
The Jacobian, recalling that we set r 0 = r eq 0 in what follows, is given by J (r 0 ) = I K+L − ∇ r 0 B (r 0 ; p, q, θ) where
e n|K (r 0 )
where we define
.
Note that for all r 0 ∈ T and k = 1, . . . , K and l = 1, . . . , L we have L l=1 e l|k (r 0 ) < 1 and
In what follows I will use the abbreviated notation e l|k = e l|k (r 0 ) and g k|l = g k|l (r 0 ) .
Step 2: Factorization of Jacobian matrix
By the Implicit Function Theorem we have
The K + L × 1 vector of partial derivatives, consists of a zero vector with the exception of the k th and (K + l) th elements, which equal −r k0 (1 − r kl /p k ) and −r 0l (1 − r kl /q l ) respectively.
We begin by rewriting the Jacobian matrix in the form
where the second equality exploits the diagonality of A (r 0 ), C (r 0 ), and U (r 0 ), defined as:
Observe that all the elements of H (r 0 ) are non-negative and that its rows sum to one (i.e.,
. Therefore H(r 0 ) is a row stochastic matrix (cf., Horn and Johnson, 2013, p.
547) with an inverse whose rows also sum to one since:
Step 3: Derivation of Z-matrix property
Observe that H * (r 0 ) is strictly diagonally dominant since, for i = 1, . . . , K,
and, 
and also
Partitioning H (r 0 ) conformably to the H * (r 0 ) partition defined above we therefore have that the Step 4: Derivation of the structure of H (r 0 ) 
. . .
This implies that the diagonal elements of H (r 0 ) −1 exceed one.
For the off-diagonal blocks of H (r 0 ) −1 we have
Evaluating −H Step 5a: Type-specific elasticities of single-hood with respect to type availability Let h k be a K + L column vector of zeros with the exception of a one in the k th row. The K + L elasticities of single-hood with respect to p k are given by
The sign structure of H (r 0 ) −1 as well as strict dominance of its two diagonal blocks in their column entries gives part 1 of Theorem 1. Specifically, tedious calculation yields dr 10 dp k
Step 5b: Limited symmetry
The entire matrix of semi-elasticities can be written as
is symmetric and hence, also using the calculation immediately above,
from which the result follows.
Step 5c: Aggregate elasticity of single-hood with respect to type availability
The elasticity of single-hood with respect to p k is given by
, where I use the fact, shown above, that H (r 0 ) −1 ι K+L = ι K+L . Now consider the effect of an increase in the population size of women, holding its type distribution fixed (i.e, we increase d (p ι K ) such that dp k d(p ι K ) = p k / (p ι K ) for k = 1, . . . , K). This yields
and hence
. This is reported in equation (14) of the main text.
Step 5d: Constant Returns to Scale
The demand functions for single-hood are homogenous of degree one since
with the result following from Euler's Theorem.
Step 5e Semi-elasticity of single-hood with respect to γ kl
The approximate percent increase in single-hood for each of the K + L types of agents given a unit increase in γ kl is given by . . .
The required semi-elasticity is then, making use of the row stochastic structure of H (r 0 ), 
Hence the change in the fraction of the population that is single equals
as reported in equation (15) of the main text.
